



Firm U: Unleveraged			
	E	conomy	
	Bad	Avg.	Good
Prob.	0.25	0.50	0.25
EBIT	\$2,000	\$3,000	\$4,000
Interest	0	0	C
EBT	\$2,000	\$3,000	\$4,000
Taxes (40%)	800	1,200	1,600
NI	\$1,200	\$1,800	\$2,400
Faxes (40%)	800	1,200	1,60


Firm L: Leveraged				
	Economy			
	Bad	Avg.	Good	
Prob.*	0.25	0.50	0.25	
EBIT*	\$2,000	\$3,000	\$4,000	
Interest	1,200	1,200	1,200	
EBT	\$ 800	\$1,800	\$2,800	
Taxes (40%)	320	720	1,120	
NI	\$ 480	\$1,080	\$1,680	


	arison betw unleverageo		ged and
FIRM U	Bad	Avg	Good
BEP	10.0%	15.0%	20.0%
ROE	6.0%	9.0%	12.0%
TIE	∞	Ø	∞
FIRM L	Bad	Avg	Good
BEP	10.0%	15.0%	20.0%
ROE	4.8%	10.8%	16.8%
TIE	1.67x	2.50x	3.30x

	return for	leveraged and d firms	
Expected Values	s:	Sector Street	
	Firm U	Firm L	
E(BEP)	15.0%	15.0%	
E(ROE)	9.0%	10.8%	
E(TIE)	00	2.5x	
Risk Measures:			
	Firm U	Firm L	
σ_{ROE}	2.12%	4.24%	
CV _{ROE}	0.24	0.39	


















		r calcula ning the r	-		
Amount porrowed	D/A ratio	E/A ratio	k _s	k _d (1 – T)	WACC
\$ 0	0.00%	100.00%	12.00%	0.00%	12.00%
250	12.50	87.50	12.51	4.80	11.55
500	25.00	75.00	13.20	5.40	11.25
	37.50	62.50	14.16	6.90	11.44
750					


Table for determining the stock price maximizing capital structure			
Amount Borrowed	DPS	k _s _	P ₀
\$ 0	\$3.00	12.00%	\$25.00
250,000	3.26	12.51	26.03
500,000	3.55	13.20	26.89
750,000	3.77	14.16	26.59
1,000,000	3.90	15.60	25.00









































 Managers cannot simply tell investors what they know because investors may not believe them

 With information asymmetry present, the old saying "action speaks louder than words" becomes paramount.

37


Investors know watch managers actions for clues.

<text><text><list-item><page-footer>

 Generally, this means managers are more likely to use debt when they view the future as favorable. In such a situation they see no reason to "fear" fixed payment amounts.

They are more likely to choose equity when prospects are more uncertain.

39




Agency costs

 In many corporations, the managers of the firm own relative small portions of the company.

 Thus, they may have incentives to operate in a manner which is not most beneficial to shareholders.

41





- Which of the theories are most correct?
- Clearly, the original M&M theorem is not what we face in the "real world."
- (Of course, the importance of it is that it identifies the factors that may cause capital structure to matter.)

43

